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DRAWING THE LINE ON INCUMBENCY PROTECTION
Sally Dworak-Fisher*
In the wake of each census, reapportionment emerges as a subject for de-
bate. How district lines are drawn has a major impact on electoral
outcomes. A dubious aspect of this line drawing is that it remains under
the control of incumbents. It is in the interest of these incumbents, who
are disproportionately White, to draw district lines to promote their
chances for re-election and to promote fellow party members'chances for
re-election. Protection of incumbents is often seen as a desirable goal for
reasons such as a stable legislature, quality candidates, and seniority
advantages. However, protection of incumbents is unnecessary to ac-
complish the bulk of these objectives. The costs of protection far outweigh
the benefits. Still, the Supreme Court refused to address the problem of
incumbency and redistricting because it considered the issue to be a po-
litical contest. At the same time, the Court took an active role in racial
gerrymandering claims to ensure that race was not a predominant influ-
ence. Consequently, White incumbents are protected at the expense of
efforts to enhance minority voting power; the result is a strikingly ho-
mogeneous legislature. If the integrity of the democratic system is to be
maintained, the Court must eliminate its double standard when review-
ing gerrymandering cases.
The health of democracies, of whatever type and range, depends
on one wretched technical detail-electoral procedure.
All the rest is secondary.'
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of each decennial census, reapportionment and re-
districting2  become the focus of academic debate and costly
litigation. In recent years, much of the debate has revolved around
* Book Review Editor, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 2, 1996-97. B.A.
1989, Cornell University; J.D. expected 1997, University of Michigan Law School.
1. JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 158 (1932), reprinted in
Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural
Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301 (1991).
2. Reapportionment refers to the redistribution of seats in the House of Representa-
tives among the states due to fluctuations in population; redistricting refers to the
redrawing of Congressional district boundaries within the states. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 925 (Congressional Quarterly Inc. ed., 1994).
This Note uses the terms interchangeably.
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the limits of the Voting Rights Act3 and the use of race as a factor in
redistricting.4 While courts and academics alike have struggled to
delineate the constitutional parameters of the use of race, an argua-
bly more problematic aspect of the process-the influence of
incumbents-remains conspicuously unexamined. To the limited
extent that incumbents' influence in the redistricting process has
been acknowledged by courts, it has been accepted and even en-
dorsed without analysis." Moreover, this unquestioned acceptance
by the judiciary mirrors the surprising dearth of analysis and debate
about the issue among academics.6
The ability of incumbents to influence district boundaries in an
effort to enhance the likelihood of their re-election raises a number
of complex issues. First, the question arises as to whether the pro-
tection of incumbents through redistricting makes sense from a
policy perspective. Answering that question involves consideration
of the potential benefits of protecting incumbents and of the argu-
ments that doing so undermines the legitimacy of the electoral
process. Second, the issue of incumbency protection must be ana-
lyzed in the context of contemporary American society. It may be
that protecting incumbents makes sense on an abstract level, but in
the context of competing objectives-the creation of majority-
minority districts to alleviate effects of past discrimination, for ex-
ample-it conflicts with those efforts and should be reconsidered.
Finally, the issue is deeply embedded in even larger questions of
who should be responsible for redistricting plans and how they
should be evaluated.
In an effort to fill the void in scholarly debate and legal analy-
sis, this Note evaluates incumbency protection as a redistricting
principle and analyzes its treatment in various court opinions. After
arguing that protecting incumbents is not a legitimate redistricting
objective, this Note illustrates how the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have been reluctant to pass judgment on incumbency
protection. This Note contrasts this "hands-off" approach to the strict
scrutiny afforded claims of racial gerrymandering and argues that
3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
4. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588 (1993); Richard H.
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483
(1993).
5. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F.
Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
6. But see Kristen Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 4
TEX. L. REV. 913 (1996).
[VOL. 2:131
Incumbency Protection
such an approach enables incumbents to manipulate the Voting
Rights Act for their self-interest. Additionally, this Note argues that
incumbents, a disproportionate majority of whom are White,7 are
effectively protected at the expense of efforts to enhance minority
voting power and that the Court's double standard offends notions
of equal protection. This Note concludes that the current approach
to redistricting undermines the legitimacy of the electoral process
and briefly considers alternatives.
I. INCUMBENTS AND REDISTRICTING: WHAT ARE THE STAKES?
According to social choice theory, those who control the process
by which choices are offered also have the potential to manipulate
the outcome.8 In terms of redistricting, this means that those who
have power over the redistricting process also have power to draw
the lines to their own advantage. The relationship between redis-
tricting and democracy cannot be overstated: in a society that
governs by majority-rule legislatures comprised of representatives
of single-member, winner-take-all districts, the contours of the dis-
trict lines affect who wins the election and whose public policy
agenda is enacted. More concretely, the redistricting plan enacted
will "help to determine whether the House will be dominated by
Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives, and whether
racial or ethnic minorities receive fair representation."9
Perhaps because of the importance of redistricting, few people
agree on how it should be conducted. Currently, the process varies
from state to state, but it is most often completed b7 the representa-
tives of the states where redistricting takes place.' Thus, often the
very politicians who are running for election are in control of the
redistricting plan. The districts created by the incumbents are then
passed into law and used in elections until another plan is needed;
7. African Americans compose 12.6% of the resident population in the United
States while they make up only 7% of Congress; Latinos compose 10.2% of the
population and hold only 3% of the seats in Congress. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK (1995); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Su-
preme Court's Double Standard: Gerrymander Hypocrisy, THE NATION, February 26,
1995, at 167.
8. Social choice theory refers generally to the idea that the will of a majority is
determined by the process used to derive it. For an explanation of social choice the-
ory and how it applies in the context of redistricting, see Silverberg, supra note 6.
9. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 2, at 925.
10. See id. There are notable exceptions to this rule, however. Several states,
among them Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania, have created electoral commissions to draw district lines without reference to
political considerations.
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most often this occurs after the decennial census when population
shifts are documented."
Not surprisingly, the battles over what redistricting plan will be
enacted are among the fiercest in American politics. In the usual
scenario, members of the majority party in the state attempt to create
as many election districts favorable to their party as possible. 2 The
stakes are incredibly high:
[L]egislators are fighting for .. .their party, just as surely
as in an election campaign, but with more durable results.
Depending on how district lines are drawn, a party with
only a minority of the popular vote can assert control over
a majority of seats in the state assembly and over its state's
delegation to the national House of Representatives. More
typically, a party that enjoys only a small majority in
popular support over its principal competitor will, through
its control of the districting process, translate this popular
edge into preemptive institutional dominance. 3
The success of the majority party is not, however, the only con-
sideration that influences the proposed district boundaries.
Legislators involved in the redistricting process are also heavily in-
fluenced by their personal stake in the outcome:
The district lines drawn . . . can determine the strength of
an incumbent's position and the chances of his or her po-
litical survival. They can also influence who runs against
an incumbent and how much money will have to be spent
on both sides. Given these stakes, legislators cannot help
analyzing plans from the perspective of how they are per-
sonally affected.'4
The fact that political self-interest is foremost in the minds of
most legislators is hardly a secret." In the words of Phil Burton, ar-
chitect of the infamous California congressional districts in 1981 and
1982, "The most important thing you do, before anything else, is you
get yourself in a position to draw lines for [your own] district. Then,
11. This is due to the constitutional requirement of equally populated districts. See
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 2, at
926.
13. Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 302.
14. BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 1 (1984).
15. For example, Representative George E. Brown, Jr.(D. Cal.) admitted to the Wall
Street Journal that he believed good gerrymandering "was essential" to making his
district safe for another two terms. Paul Gigot, Incumbent for Life: I Came, I Saw, I Ger-
rymandered, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1988, at A14.
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you draw them for all your friends... . 16 Referring candidly to his
attempt to protect the Democratic Party and his brother John, Burton
reportedly remarked that the zig-zagging district lines were his
"contribution to modern art."' 7
As a result of the high stakes and obvious temptation for self-
dealing, redistricting raises concerns about gerrymandering. Gerry-
mandering, "the intentional manipulation of territory toward some
desired electoral outcome ... [that] affect[s] the societal distribution
of power,"' 8 is widely perceived as a threat to democracy.'9 Gerry-
mandering is considered "opposite in spirit and in practice to the
'rational persuasion' paradigm of getting votes" because its purpose
is to eliminate the need for appeal! Thus, gerrymandering is
viewed as an unjustified advantage for the party of the incumbent
who can alter the distribution of votes, and thereby increase the
21
likelihood of victory. While some, including many social choice
theorists, would argue that the potential for gerrymandering is in-
herent in the system, others counter that the potential has been
greatly abused.
Due to advances in technology, the problem of gerrymandering
is now considered significantly more acute today than previously. In
earlier times, manipulation of district boundaries was arguably
more likely to backfire because accurate data on voters were difficult
16. Gordon E. Baker, The Totality of the Circumstances Approach, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 203, 207-08 (Bernard Grofman, ed., 1990)
[hereinafter POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING].
17. Frederick K. Lowell & Teresa A. Craigie, California's Reapportionment Struggle:
A Classic Clash Between Law and Politics, 2 J.L. & POL. 245, 246 (1985) (citation omit-
ted).
18. Richard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING,
supra note 16, at 212.
19. See, e.g., BRUCE ADAMS, TOWARD A SYSTEM OF "FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REP-
RESENTATION": A COMMON CAUSE REPORT ON STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL
REAPPORTIONMENT 24 (1977); James A. Gardner, The Uses and Abuses of Incumbency:
People v. Ohrenstein and the Limits of Inherent Legislative Power, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
217 (1991); Polsby & Popper, supra note 1.
20. Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 314.
21. See Charles Backstrom et al., Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure
of Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (1978).
The type of advantage referred to is well illustrated in the case of Massachu-
setts Governor Eldridge Gerry, after whom the term "gerrymandering" was coined.
In that case, the redistricting plan passed by the majority party packed the opposing
Federalist party's supporters into a few districts and divided the remaining support-
ers into other districts. The convoluted districts were effective in insuring the
majority party's control. Despite having lost the popular vote, the party won twenty-
nine of the forty state senate seats. See Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymander-
ing, 45 FLA. L. REv. 403, 406 (1993).
22. See generally Polsby & Popper, supra note 1.
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to collect.2 Within the last decade or so, new computers, better mar-
ket research, and advanced data bases have enabled legislators to
gerrymander with more precision. In fact, "a computer can churn
out not one but hundreds of... districting plans which affect out-
comes, power relationships in the legislature, and representation.
"25
Not surprisingly, politicians now frequently hire consultants and
use computer programs to generate potential districts from which26
they can choose. Incumbents' potential ability to more accurately
manipulate the outcome of elections through database information,
computer information and computer programs has exacerbated
traditional unease with self-dealing and increased scrutiny of the
redistricting process.
II. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF PROTECTING INCUMBENTS
Proponents of incumbency protection in redistricting offer vari-
ous arguments to support their position. Rationales for that policy
include an ability to attract quality candidates, the promotion of a
stable legislature, the desire to capitalize on seniority, and a lack of
neutral alternatives. While these justifications may appear legitimate
at first blush, reasoned analysis reveals that they are not as strong as
they initially appear. Moreover, competing considerations weigh
strongly against the justifications regardless of their strength. Con-
cern about the effect of incumbency protection on the legitimacy of
the electoral process, for example, strikes at the heart of democratic
ideals and suggests that the policy is illegitimate regardless of the
justifications. Examination of the competing rationales leads to the
23. See Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of
Racial Gerrymandering, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652, 664 (1993).
24. See id.
25. Robert G. Dixon Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Dis-
tricts, in REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISsuES 7, 8 (Bernard Grofman et al.,
eds., 1982)
26. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 303. In Indiana for example:
[In 1981 the] Republican State Committee enlisted Market Opinion Research,
Inc., a Michigan market research firm, to assist in the creation of the Republi-
can gerrymander. The Committee housed the computer equipment in its
headquarters and paid $250,000 to Market Opinion Research for their serv-
ices .... Computer systems to assist in redistricting first appeared in the mid-
1960s. By 1971 ... state party organizations used computers extensively.
These systems were archaic by today's standards.
David L. Anderson, Note, When Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Gerrymandering
and the Status Quo Ante, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1549, 1557 (1990) (citations omitted).
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conclusion that incumbency protection is an illegitimate redistricting
objective. 27
A. Quality Candidates and a Stable Legislature
A common justification for allowing incumbents to influence
redistricting is the argument that such protection is necessary to at-
tract quality candidates to the political arena.28 According to this
rationale, qualified men and women will not seek election unless it
affords the opportunity of a career. Affording incumbents or their
political party this power is a means of increasing the security of the
office and convincing high-quality individuals to become candi-
dates. Without the power to influence district boundaries, a position
in public office would be so insecure that a substantial number of
otherwise qualified and interested individuals would be deterred
from seeking election.29 Because society values attracting talented
candidates, incumbents are afforded job security by allowing them
some control over redistricting.
Advocates argue that promoting the security of the incumbent's
position also serves another objective, enhancing the stability and
effectiveness of the legislature. Because the creation of less competi-
tive seats ensures that small swings in the votes will not have large
effects on the composition of the legislature, the legislature remains
stable. The participation of the incumbents in the process also acts as
a check on any potentially radical changes, and promotes meaning-
ful participation by the electorate:
[A]llowing legislators to participate in reapportionment
puts the brake on major departures from the status quo
and hands over the ultimate decision on district lines to
individuals with [a] vested interest[s] in district continuity.
That interest in continuity is not necessarily deleterious to
the democratic process. Name recognition and familiarity
make it easier for voters to know what the incumbent
stands for and what [sihe has done: from a policy perspec-
tive, the voters are more informed and their votes are more
meaningful.30
27. For an analysis of the legitimacy of allowing incumbent legislators to control
the redistricting process using social choice theory, see Silverberg, supra note 6.
28. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1350
(1987).
29. See CAIN, supra note 14, at 12 (discussing the threat of arbitrary removal as a
deterrence to attracting quality people); id. at 186 (discussing using safe seats as a
means of promoting legislative professionalism).
30. Id. at 185.
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Moreover, the protection of incumbents promotes better gov-
ernment because "a legislature based upon the ideal of stability
might produce more consistent policy over time... ,31 Finally, pro-
tecting incumbents promotes careerism, which is desirable because
"[ilt engenders loyalty, helps define an institution's place in its social
and political environment, and lends stability by ensuring the pres-
ence of experienced members."
32
B. Stability and Quality Rebuttals
While the argument that protecting incumbents promotes sta-
bility and is necessary to attract quality candidates has an intuitive
appeal, such protection is unnecessary for a number of reasons. First,
the Framers designed the national legislature in such a way as to
ensure stability even in the event that every member of the House of
Representatives lost in a re-election battle:
Technically, the entire membership of the House could be
overturned every two years. This was part of the Framers'
"dangerous" experiment with popular rule. The danger, as
it was perceived at the time (and it was part of the argu-
ment for a Senate), was that the House would be too
swayed by the changeable winds of public passion to
permit sober perspective to develop with time.33
In part to respond to the fear of instability, the Senate was
added, creating a separate house of the legislature with members
whose qualifications were different and whose terms of office were
longer. One of the objectives of the Senate was to temper "the pro-
pensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to... sudden
and violent passions" and provide stability in the face of "rapid suc-
cession of new members, however qualified they may be. ,34 Thus,
the arguments about stability and continuity were already consid-
ered in the design of the political institution, leaving little, if any
justification for additional provisions for stability.
Second, even if one doubted the Framers' ability to ensure the
stability of Congress through the bi-cameral legislature, there is little
to suggest that incumbency protection through redistricting is
31. Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legis-
lature to Police Itself, 4 J.L. & Pol. 653, 683 (1988).
32. ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 34
(1985).
33. BARBARA HINCKLEY, STABILITY AND CHANGE 9 (1978).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 184-85 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1981).
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necessary for the task. As an initial matter, re-election rates are so
high that concerns about entrenchment are more common than
concerns about stability." A house-cleaning year such as 1992, when
more than three-quarters of the members of Congress were returned
to office,36 suggests that one would have to do more than just remove
protection through redistricting before instability would be a
concern; it also suggests that potential candidates are unlikely to be
discouraged by the limited potential for a career. Indeed, history
shows that the system is capable of handling significantly greater
turnover without complaints of unqualified candidates: "Through-
out most of the 19 " century, service in the House was likely to be a
matter of one, or, at most, a few terms.3 Accordingly, turnover
during that period ranged from 30 to over 60% at every election,38
and qualified candidates continued to pursue political careers.
1. Built-In Incumbency Advantages
The fact that incumbents also enjoy significant advantages over
challengers undermines both the notion that incumbency protection
is needed for stability and that it is crucial to attracting quality can-
didates. For example, regardless of their influence over redistricting,
incumbents receive a number of benefits by virtue of their visibility
as public officials: "Being an incumbent means, in addition to other
things, receiving more news coverage, more endorsements, and
having more money to spend on television advertising. 39 Such
visibility is an added advantage in the context of extremely low
public interest, where name recognition alone may be the basis on
which voters cast their ballots.'0 Indeed, studies have shown that
most voters recognize the incumbent's name in all districts and that
voters who were unable to recognize the challenger's name were
much more likely to vote for the incumbent.4
Incumbents also benefit from a number of official privileges
which enhance their chances for re-election and make a political
career a realistic possibility. Perhaps the most well known of the
35. See generally Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform:
A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1131 (1994).
36. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 2.
37. H. Douglas Price, Congress and the Evolution of Legislative Professionalism, in 2
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 89 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1991).
38. See id.
39. MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 44 (4th ed. 1986).
40. See HINCKLEY, supra note 33, at 23-24.
41. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 663
(1995).
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incumbents' privileges is the franking privilege, which allows an
officeholder to mail letters by writing a signature where a stamp
belongs. This privilege has become a tool which incumbents use to
target voters with carefully targeted messages through computer-
ized mass-mailing systems. At times some incumbents have even
sent their literature to voters who are not present constituents, but
who may later become district residents as a result of redistricting.42
The magnitude of this advantage is illustrated by the fact that the
average incumbent spends more of the taxpayers' money on franked
mailings than the average challenger spends on his/her entire
campaign.4
In addition to using the franking privilege, members of both
Houses have complete access to two congressional recording studios
to tape their own cable network interview shows and radio broad-
casts funded with tax dollars." Not surprisingly, incumbents now
often rely heavily on prepackaged videotapes which they send home
to local television stations and have aired as straight news reports
without any indication that they were prepared by the incumbent
and financed by the taxpayers.4' This increased media attention is an
additional bonus above the media that an incumbent gains naturally
through his/her status as a representative.
Perhaps the most obvious-and the most controversial-of the
benefits that advantage incumbents in re-election are the campaign
finance rules. As a result of a 1976 Supreme Court decision,46 there
are now limits on the amounts that individuals may contribute to
congressional campaigns, but there are no limits on the amounts
candidates may spend to run for office.47 At the same time, Political
Action Committees (PACs), which give more than ninety percent of
their funding to incumbents, are permitted to donate five times as
much money to a campaign as an individual.48 Meanwhile, since the
Court's decision, spending on congressional campaigns has sky-
rocketed.49 This situation seriously disadvantages challengers who
generally need to outspend incumbents to make up for the other
benefits incumbents enjoy.i° In sum,
42. See Paul Jacob, From the Voters with Care, reprinted in LOWENSTEIN, supra note
41, at 700-01.
43. See id.
44. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 41.
45. See id.
46. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976).
47. See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 35, at 1131 (1994).
48. See id.
49. See id.; House winners in the 1976 election averaged $87,280 on their cam-
paigns while in the 1992 campaign the average winning candidate spent $549,571,
more than a six-fold increase from 1976. See id. at 1132.
50. See Jacob, supra note 42, at 702-03.
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[t]he built-in resources of congressional office are so great
that they not only give incumbents a nearly unbeatable
advantage, but they scare off potential challengers. The
costs of campaigning have become so great that there is a
declining number of serious challengers who can mount
the necessary effort ......
Given the already overwhelming obstacles to mounting an ef-
fective campaign against an incumbent, the argument that
incumbency protection through redistricting is necessary for stabil-
ity and to attract quality candidates appears, at best, disingenuous.
C. Capitalizing on Seniority
The objectives of attracting quality candidates and promoting
the stability and effectiveness of the legislature are said to have spe-
cial force in the context of the rules that operate within Congress.
The seniority rules in particular are cited as another justification for
protecting experienced legislators.52 In the most basic sense, Con-
gress' seniority system is "a device for selecting the leaders of the
standing committees."53 Leadership of a committee is a coveted po-
sition because it enables a legislator to have considerable influence
over legislation. Committee chairs have substantial procedural pow-
ers; they decide the time and frequency of meetings, determine the
agenda, and schedule hearings on proposed legislation, 4 Thus, if a
committee chair is opposed to a piece of legislation, s/he can delay
the scheduling hearings or refuse to schedule regular meetings.5 Ac-
cording to one source, "Chairmen [also] determine the time allocated
for hearings; they preside over meetings and control its agenda. A
determined chairman . . .can delay hearings indefinitely, and can
also prevent a member from gaining a vote on a bill for a long
time .... ,,6
However, the seniority system does not only affect the
assignment of leadership positions in committees, however. Rather,
"it pervades the whole life of the Congress .... Seniority confers
status upon members which affects much of their legislative life and
51. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 41, at 647.
52. See, e.g., DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 32, at 34; BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE
SENIORITY SYSTEM IN CONGRESS 4 (1971).
53. HINCKLEY, supra note 52.
54. See id. at 89.
55. For example, Graham Barden, former Chairman of the House Education and
Labor Committee, refused to schedule regular meetings. See id. at 90. Likewise,
Chairman Howard Smith delayed scheduling hearings on civil rights legislation. See
id. at 90.
56. JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 152.
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especially the perquisites available to them.57 For example, seniority
also affects who will be rewarded their choice of committee assign-
ments, who will be assigned to what office space, and who will
receive recognition both on the floor and in committee hearings.
58
Thus, more than just a rule for deciding committee leadership,
"[s]eniority is a norm of central importance to a legislature."'59
Because the seniority system benefits those legislators who have
served the longest, it creates an incentive for their protection. In the
eyes of both constituents and party members, protection of incum-
bents increases the likelihood of a leadership position and thereby
also increases the likelihood of favorable legislation.6° Thus, states
that regularly do not return incumbents to office will not have legis-
lators in chairmanship positions and will be less likely to be
rewarded with favorable legislation. This in effect decreases the de-
sire to create truly competitive seats in the redistricting process
because unsafe seats decrease the probability of re-election. To the
extent that voters want their legislators to be influential in Congress,
protecting incumbents through redistricting clearly makes sense.
D. Reconsidering Seniority
Despite the attraction of protecting incumbents to reap the
benefits of the seniority rules, close examination of the seniority sys-
tem reveals that the perceived benefits may be greatly exaggerated.
Often overlooked is the fact that seniority rules for choosing com-
mittee chairs refer to the length of service on a given committee,
rather than in Congress; an incumbent who changes committees
therefore loses standing regardless of his or her length of time in the
legislature.6' In addition, the seniority rules, while still important,
are not nearly as strong as they once were. Selection of committee
chairs, for example, is no longer solely an issue of seniority. Instead,
"the criterion of seniority is generally intermingled in House deci-
sion-making with a great many other criteria of choice, and the
business of choosing [a chairperson] is not automatic, but remains in
57. Id. at 106.
58. See HINCKLEY, supra note 52, at 6.
59. JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 106.
60. Evidence of this perception can be seen from the reaction of Kansans to the
retirement of Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole after 28 years in the Senate, and
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee chair Nancy Kassenbaum in 1996.
See John Hanchette, Kansas Lieutenant Governor Tapped to Succeed Dole in Senate,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, May 24, 1996 ("There is no question we'll have less clout,
but we've had a long run with a couple of superb senators." (quoting Kansas Uni-
versity political scientist Burdett Loomis)).
61. See HINCKLEY, supra note 52, at 4.
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,, 62the hands of persons having some considerable discretion. Ac-cording to one commentator:
It may be that the seniority requirement exerts only a
marginal impact on the choice of Congressional leaders...
.Therefore, the kind of chairmen selected may be the result
of many causes, with the seniority rule only one of a num-
ber of influences, and . . . its impact may have been
considerably overstated. 3
Moreover, the tenure of committee chairs is relatively short,
with upwards of forty percent of committee leaders changing within
a decade." The high turnover, combined with emphasis on other
criteria, suggests that the position of committee chair is no longer a
position strictly dependent on length of service with the committee.
In addition to the relaxation of the criteria for appointing
committee chairs, the growing use of subcommittees has weakened
the authority of the committee chairs.6" It is now the norm to hold
most House committee hearings and working sessions at the sub-
committee level, and the full democratic membership determines the
jurisdiction and membership of the subcommittees.6 At the same
time, the ability of the committee chair to block or delay action on
bills has been weakened by the passage of the Subcommittee Bill of
Rights and the growing independence of individual members.67 In
sum,
[c]hanges in congressional committees have produced less
rigid adherence to seniority, more open decision-making,
and greater decentralization of power through the sub-
committees. One result has been to give the rank-and-file
member a greater share of power in committee decisions."
Thus, the seniority rules in Congress no longer confer an auto-
matic grant of influence to members who have been in office the
longest. Rather, younger members are given more power through
reliance on the use of subcommittees.
While the relaxation of seniority rules in itself suggests that
such rules may not be a valid justification for protecting incumbents
62. Nelson W. Polsby et al., The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of
Representatives, reprinted in 1 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: PATTERNS OF
RECRUITMENT, LEADERSHIP, AND INTERNAL STRUCTURE 305 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1991).
63. HINCKLEY, supra note 52, at 12.
64. See id. at 23.
65. See JEWELL & PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 154.
66. See id. at 155.
67. See id. at 271.
68. Id. at 170.
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in redistricting, other considerations further undermine that ration-
ale. Given that power is a zero-sum game, the objective of gaining
power by protecting incumbents through redistricting is realized
most fully when very few states pursue this objective. For example,
if only one state redistricts to protect incumbents, that state will be
represented by politicians with seniority and will enjoy a power ad-
vantage relative to the rest of the states. However, whenever any
new state begins to redistrict in order to protect its incumbents the
power returned to individual states already involved is diluted. At
the point where every state is redistricting to protect its incumbents,
the return to any given state will be zero.
With respect to redistricting to protect incumbents for seniority
purposes, realizing the zero-sum nature of the game reveals two
problems. First, in a scenario where not all states seek to protect in-
cumbents and the returns to other states are significant, the fact that
some states lose by not competing is cause for concern. While it
makes sense for any individual state to compete for its own gain, the
outcome is not necessarily better for the polity as a whole. Because
some states gain an advantage at the expense of other states, the re-
sulting power imbalance among states reflects a problematic lack of
influence among voters in those states not competing to protect their
incumbents. Second, in the scenario where all states are competing
to protect their incumbents, the equilibrium is one in which the re-
turns to any state are zero. If this is the case, the equilibrium is no
different from a situation in which no state redistricts to protect its
incumbents, and the rationale for the policy is undermined. Under
either scenario, the objective of protecting incumbents through re-
districting for the sake of seniority is hardly compelling.
Additionally, assuming experience is rewarded in Congress,
and that senior legislators are able to exert influence in a way that
benefits their districts, voters will recognize that they are the benefi-
ciaries of their legislator's seniority. In other words, if experienced
legislators are indeed better legislators because of their increased
influence, voters will be more likely to support them and they will
be re-elected on the strength of their record. The reward is one that
will be, and should be, given by the voters without manipulating the
boundaries of the districts for the protection of those legislators.
Thus, even if the seniority system in Congress was still strongly fol-
lowed, the justification for protecting incumbents through
redistricting would be weak.
E. Acquiescence and Lack of Neutral Alternatives
While security, stability, and seniority are most often offered as
justifications for protecting incumbents, they are not the only ra-
tionales that apply. To the extent that partisan gerrymanders also
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attempt to protect the incumbents of the majority party, it is also
useful to consider the rationales offered to justify partisan gerry-
manders.
One rationale put forth to justify partisan gerrymandering is
based on the notion of acquiescence. According to proponents of this
position,
[t]he rule permitting partisan gerrymandering has been
tolerated for two centuries by both parties, who as erst-
while majorities and minorities have experienced the
benefits and the burdens of that rule... and by the general
public in those jurisdictions [where plans] ... have been
adopted by popular referenda.69
Proponents argue that because the two parties are equally able
to benefit from their control of the redistricting process, it is legiti-
mate to allow the winning party to reap what benefits it may.7 Put
another way, gerrymandering is merely a "victory bonus" that ac-
crues to the party with majority support at the polls. 7 Applying this
rationale to the question of incumbency protection, it is legitimate to
allow incumbents to draw districts favorable to them, or to allow
other members of their party to protect them, because such power is
recognized and accepted as the political reward of a winning cam-
paign.
Yet another rationale often advanced to justify the current re-
districting processes is that preferable alternatives do not exist. This
argument relies on the inherently political nature of redistricting
and, like the acquiescence rationale, prefers the status quo to the un-
known. According to this theory of redistricting,
The key concept to grasp is that there are no neutral lines
for legislative districts .... [E]very line drawn aligns parti-
sans and interest blocs in a particular way different from
the alignment that would result from putting the line in
some other place. And .. .the electoral result will be dif-
ferent in each case.72
In other words, "[s]ince all reapportionments will necessarily
affect the partisan balance of a state, district lines cannot be neutral
even if the line-drawers are impartial themselves."' Because every
''neutral" criterion overtly or covertly imports a view about who
69. Schuck, supra note 28, at 1356.
70. See id. at 1358.
71. See id.
72. Dixon, supra note 25, at 7.
73. CAIN, supra note 14, at 135.
FALL 1996]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
ought to exercise power, there is nothing inherently troublesome
about the current process.74 Accordingly, allowing politicians to
draw the districts lines is no worse than allowing anyone else to
draw the lines.
The notion that there are no neutral lines applies with special
force in conjunction with the argument that partisan gerrymanders
are rarely effective. If a majority party is weak, for example, it will
not have the votes it needs to pass a gerrymandered Flan or it will
not be able to risk creating more competitive seats. Even if the
party is powerful, however, an attempt to gerrymander is likely to
be of limited value. The party leaders will want to create seats that
incumbents are likely to win with the fewest possible number of ex-
tra supporters in order to maximize the number of favorable
districts.76 This process of increasing the competitiveness of the dis-
trict often backfires: "When gerrymanderers try to spread their
party's voting strength thinly, in order to capture as many seats as
possible, they leave themselves vulnerable to electoral tides that
may sweep their party out of office."7 Thus, since districts remain
competitive even in an attempt to gerrymander, there is no reason to
adopt alternative redistricting mechanisms.
F. Alternatives and Neutrality Rebuttals
The rationale that influence over redistricting is merely a vic-
tory bonus equally available to all winners is spurious. The fact that
both sides historically have tolerated the practice does not address
the issue of whether the practice should be tolerated. As Daniel
Polsby and Robert Popper point out, "Democratic ballot box stuffing
in Chicago is not meaningfully cured by Republican ballot box
stuffing downstate. 8 Moreover, the fact that it has been tolerated by
the politicians, who sometimes gain from the policy, ignores the vot-
ers' powerlessness. Because it is the incumbents who vote for the
74. For the proposition that there are no coherent public interest criteria for
legislative districting independent of substantive conceptions of the public interest,
see Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in
the Public Interest, Elusive or Illusory? 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 66-68 (1985).
75. See id.; CAIN, supra note 14, at 151.
76. See CAIN, supra note 14, at 148-49. Proponents of this rationale point out that
the interests of the majority party leaders in a partisan gerrymander may conflict
with those of their incumbents such that districts remain competitive. In this sce-
nario, an incumbent is likely to be risk averse and want to create the least
competitive district s/he can draw. See Lowenstein and Steinberg, supra note 74, at
67-68.
77. Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 77, 156 (1985) (citation omitted).
78. Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 308.
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rules, their failure to object to the rules should not be considered a
valid indication of voter support. Likewise, whether or not district
lines produce the intended outcome does not address the validity of
the procedure. Again, ballot box stuffing and hiring goon squads
may also backfire, but that fact does not enhance their legitimacy.79
Finally, the argument that all districting is inherently political
and that therefore allowing self-interested legislators to influence the
process is not problematic seems to prove too much. The fact that
the process cannot be completely "neutral" does not mean that all
processes are equally valid. Moreover, the assumption that a rule is
not "neutral" because it is used to determine an outcome is mis-
taken: "Rules are neutral, as most people understand that term, even
though their application determines a winner."s° Neutrality in the
context of redistricting rules means "according to generally accepted
ideas of procedural fairness-in other words, that the person who
did win, should have won, with 'should' drawing its meaning from
precisely the democratic ideas that are instantiated by holding elec-
tions in the first place."'" Put another way, in the redistricting
context, a neutral rule would be one that treated all the actors in-
volved the same.82 Thus, the fact that redistricting is never a purely
neutral process does not obviate the need to ensure that the process
treats all interested parties equally.
G. Additional Concerns
1. Electoral Process Integrity & Democratic Legitimacy
While the infirmities of the rationales for incumbency
protection in themselves suggest that the policy is illegitimate,
consideration of additional concerns solidifies that conclusion. For
example, critics emphasizing the centrality of voting argue that
protecting incumbents by manipulating boundary lines to favor
their re-election threatens democracy.f They note that since the time
of the Declaration of Independence, the United States has acknowl-
edged that the government derives its just powers from the consent
of the governed. 4 A central feature of our democracy is that the
people give their consent to be governed through their appointment
of representatives. The representatives are accountable to the people,
79. See id. at 307-08.
80. Id. at 310.
81. Id. at 311.
82. See Dixon, supra note 25, at 11.
83. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Democratic Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 773
(1988); Gardner, supra note 19.
84. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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without whose support they have no claim to govern. Thus, our
democratic system depends on the ability of the electorate to vote
officials in and out of office.85
Because voters' preferences are expressed through the proce-
dures and mechanisms of voting, the mechanisms used are
extremely important. The ability to control the process of redistrict-
ing largely determines the choice voters are offered and can virtually
ensure the electoral advantage of one party or candidate.6 The con-
tours of the district lines affect the outcome of the election by
altering the numbers of supporters in a given geographic area. For a
voter, boundary lines can mean the difference between electing the
candidate s/he prefers or being in the minority; for a candidate, it
can mean the difference between winning and losing; and for soci-
ety, it can mean the difference between the Great Society and rugged
individualism. Thus, while it may be true that any line-drawing will
have political consequences, the intentional manipulation of district
boundaries for a desired outcome is qualitatively different because it
undermines the goal of attempting to objectively divine the
"collective will."
2. Undermining Accountability and
Political Self-Determination
When legislatures enact a plan designed to protect incumbents,
they also limit the power of the electorate vis-a-vis the incumbent:
"When the government uses its power to . . . influence decisions
about who gets to hold office, this basic right of political self-
determination is undermined. 's Protection of incumbents makes it
more difficult for challengers to wage an effective campaign and
allows incumbents to rely on their legislative °power over re-
districting rather than their appeal as candidates. Granting legis-
lators this power of self-selection in effect insulates them from the
popular will and is contrary to the notion of democracy embedded
in the Consti-tution. 9 In sum, the manipulation of boundaries to
favor an incum-bent undermines "the meaningful and effective
participation of voters in electing individuals who meet [their views]
of representation ....
85. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-18, at 1097 (2d
ed. 1988).
86. For an explanation of social choice theory and its application to the redistrict-
ing process, see Silverberg, supra note 6.
87. Gardner, supra note 19, at 221.
88. See id. at 223.
89. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 304.
90. See Morrill, supra note 18, at 213.
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One concomitant of the ability to manipulate the political will is
the incumbents' increased freedom from accountability. In the eyes
of critics, this freedom also threatens the democratic system.9' Line
drawing that favors the re-election of an incumbent insulates the
representative from the reproach of her/his constituency: "By re-
drawing district lines in such a way as to favor their own reelection,
incumbents can partially protect themselves from challenge. They
can pursue their self-interests at the expense of their constituents'
interests with less fear of being unseated. Moreover, creating less
competitive districts also results in less effective representation in
single member districts because "[s]afe districts remove the incentive
to grant political concessions to constituent interests or create elec-
toral coalitions [that] ensure representation of diverse points of
view."93 Because incumbents protected by gerrymanders have less
need to make compromises to assure their success, critics also claim
that they are more likely to be ideologues.94 In sum, incumbents who
can rely on re-election can also be less sensitive to the interests of the
voters in their district, and that diminished accountability is anti-
thetical to the ideal of representative democracy.
3. Ripple Effects and Voter Disillusionment
Manipulation of district boundaries also has second-order
effects beyond the immediate contest between two politicians. In
addition to frustrating the ability to elect a challenger, control of
redistricting also enables a party with only a minority of the popular
vote to gain control of a majority of seats in the state assembly and
in its delegation to the House of Representatives." Having secured
the majority of the districts, the legislators are then also in a position
to transform their edge into "preemptive institutional dominance."96
In addition to partisan effects, incumbents who win one election
because of gerrymandering thereafter enjoy other benefits of incum-
bency, such as enhanced name recognition, that make their
91. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 19, at 24.
92. Ortiz, supra note 31, at 675; see also Gerhard Casper, Apportionment and the
Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 12 ("[Flavoring in-
cumbents often is no more than a euphemism employed by those incumbents for
perpetuating themselves as a power elite unaccountable to the voters because of
skewed districting.")
93., See ADAMS, supra note 19, at 24 (1977).
94. See, e.g., Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 306 (arguing that the Madisonian
version of constitutional democracy is undermined because the strategy of acquiring
support of the majority of voters who cluster toward the "middle" of the political
spectrum is not necessary, absent competitive districts).
95. See Lewyn, supra note 21, at 406.
96. Id.
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re-election more likely regardless of whether future districting is
favorable to them.97 Thus, an effective gerrymander not only impacts
the will of the voters in the election immediately following
redistricting, but it arguably gives the majority party and its
incumbents power to benefit from that distortion thereafter.
Finally, redistricting with the goal of protecting incumbents is
troublesome because of its effect on the perceived legitimacy of the
system. By reducing the competitiveness of elections, the incumbent
gerrymander causes voters to question the integrity of the system. In
the words of one analyst: "If done poorly, districting can create a
sense of disenfranchisement and futility .... ,9 This is likely to occur
when the same group of voters consistently feels powerless: "If a
particular rule works to the systematic disadvantage of one group
over another, members of that group are less likely to think the
rules, and any policies produced by them, are legitimate."99
Disenfranchisement triggers a cycle of diminishing faith in the
process leading to "reduced voter participation, reduced willingness
to support the government, and, [ultimately,] reduced quality of
government."' ° One critic alleges that incumbents' influence has
already created the "public perception that legislators are single-
minded seekers of re-election whose desire for job security far
exceeds their desire or ability to fulfill the public duties with which
they are entrusted."'1 Thus, because voters feel that the results are
predetermined, many are apathetic to voting and considerable
doubt is cast on the legitimacy of the election process.
III. INCUMBENCY PROTECTION AND THE COURTS
Despite its deficiencies, incumbency protection remains one of
the most powerful influences in redistricting plans. In part, incum-
bents' ability to manipulate districts to their own advantage stems
from the reluctance of the judiciary to analyze the redistricting proc-
ess. The Supreme Court, viewing redistricting as a largely political
contest posing non-justiciable issues, has developed an extremely
high standard for proving partisan gerrymandering claims.
While the Court's unwillingness to address incumbents'
influence makes sense in terms of Article III justiciability
requirements, it stands in stark contrast to the approach to claims of
97. Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 308.
98. Morrill, supra note 18, at 213.
99. Cain, Perspectives on Davis, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS,
supra note 16, at 132.
100. Morrill, supra note 18, at 213.
101. Gardner, supra note 19, at 217.
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racial gerrymandering, where the Court has become deeply
involved in reviewing state plans to ensure that race was not a
"predominant" influence in the process.0 2 The effect of the Court's
double standard has been to protect primarily White incumbents at
the expense of efforts to enhance minority voting power. Essentially,
the Court is engaged in a process of denying equal protection that
undermines its legitimacy as an institution and the electoral
processes upon which our democracy depends. Analysis of the case
law illustrates this development.
A. The Early Cases
While the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s brought
with it attention to qualitative aspects of voting and the search for
"fair and effective representation for all citizens,"'03 the Supreme
Court was reluctant to become involved in the more political aspects
of reapportionment, including partisan gerrymandering.' ° Instead,
the Court focused most of its attention on the application of the one-
person, one-vote standard (the equigopulation principle)'5 as the
means of achieving political fairness.' 6 Along with the reluctance to
consider partisan gerrymandering claims was a failure to scrutinize
the legitimacy of incumbency protection as a districting principle.
The Court referred to the issue in a footnote in Burns v. Richardson, a
case dealing with the application of the equipopulation standard.' 7
In Burns, the Court rejected the contention that districts in Hawaii
were discriminatory, stating, "The fact that district boundaries may
have been drawn in a way that minimizes the number of contests
between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish in-
vidiousness."'0 8 Without further discussion of whether and when
protecting incumbents would ever be considered problematic, the
Court upheld the apportionment plans.
In a later reapportionment case, Gaffney v. Cummings,'°9 the
Court elaborated on its reluctance to scrutinize the details of the
redistricting process and intimated that incumbency protection in
redistricting was a legitimate part of the political process. The Court
102. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
103. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544 (1964).
104. See Grofman, supra note 77, at 100.
105. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (requiring State to construct districts "as nearly
of equal population as is practicable").
106. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1643, 1648-49 (1993).
107. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966).
108. Id.
109. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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ruled that a state legislative plan that seeks to provide proportional
representation to political parties may deviate from strict equality.
The Court was unequivocal in its insistence on limited judicial
involvement: "From the very outset, we recognized that the
apportionment task, dealing as it must with fundamental 'choices
about the nature of representation,' is primarily a political and
legislative process.""' The Court rejected the claim that the plan
represented a political gerrymander evidenced by "indecent" district
shapes, stating, "compactness or attractiveness has never been held
to constitute an independent federal constitutional require-
ment .... .""' Validating the political jockeying in the redistricting
process, the Court went on to say,
Politics and political considerations are inseparable from
districting and apportionment .... District lines are rarely
a neutral phenomena. They can well determine what dis-
trict will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly
Republican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting may
pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult
the election of the most experienced legislator. The reality
is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have
substantial political consequences. 2
In addition, the Court rejected the "politically mindless ap-
proach" of ignoring political data in redistricting,"3 preferring
instead to allow those who redistrict to seek "to achieve the political
or other ends of the State, its constituents, and its officeholders.
' '" 4
In White v. Weiser, a case dealing with congressional redistrict-
ing, decided the same day as Gaffney, the Court took the position
that federal courts should honor state policy and defer from intrud-
ing on legislative plans to the extent possible."' The Court held that
in choosing among possible plans, the district court erred in choos-
ing the plan that was more compact over the plan that most clearly
approximated the state policies and preferences." 6 The Court de-
clared that the reviewing court is obliged to "follow the policies and
preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional
provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state
legislature.'" 7
110. Id. at 749 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 752 n.18.
112. Id. at 753.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 754 (emphasis added).
115. 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
116. See id. at 796.
117. Id. at 795.
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Significantly, the state policy in Weiser was "aimed at main-
taining existing relationships between incumbent congressmen and
their constituents and preserving the seniority the members of the
State's delegation have achieved in the United States House of
Representatives."' 8 The Court specifically stated: "[w]e do not
disparage this interest.""9 The Court criticized the district court for
not following state preferences in a case where it did not also "hold
that the legislative policy of districting so as to preserve the
constituencies of congressional incumbents was unconstitutional or
even undesirable." 20 While the Court left open the question of the
legitimacy of protecting incumbents through redistricting, its ad-
monishment of the district court evinces a reluctance to address the
question and an implicit acceptance of state freedom to determine
redistricting criteria.
B. Karcher v. Daggett
The Court's "hands-off' attitude toward the political jockeying
in the redistricting process began to change gradually in the 1980s
after the development of racial gerrymandering claims. In Karcher v.
Daggett,'2' a majority of the Court declared its willingness to deviate
from the one-person, one-vote standard and to affirm the legitimacy
of other districting goals without scrutiny: "Any number of
consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance
[from strict population equality], including, for instance, making
districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the
cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent
Representatives."'2 Because the Court found the violation of
equipopulation principle conclusive,'2 it left unaddressed the fact
that "in a flight of cartographic fancy, the Legislature packed North
Jersey Republicans into a new district many call 'the Swan.' ,124
Karcher v. Daggett, while illustrating the Court's traditional
stance, also marked a turning point for the Court. In addressing the
shortcomings of the Court's blind adherence to the equipopulation
118. Id. at 791.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 797.
121. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
122. Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
123. The deviation in New Jersey's districts was less than the margin of error re-
sulting from undercounts in the census, meaning that "there was no assurance that
the apparently underpopulated districts were less populous than the seemingly
overpopulated ones, or that the situation could have been remedied by the Court's
zero tolerance standard for deviations from the equipopulation rule." Issacharoff,
supra note 106, at 1656.
124. 462 U.S. at 762 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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principle, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion advocated recognizing
a claim of political gerrymandering. Stevens declared, "political
gerrymandering is one species of 'vote dilution' proscribed by the
Equal Protection Clause."' 2 Arguing that the Constitution provides
broader protection than the one-person, one-vote standard, Stevens
wrote,
The Equal Protection Clause requires every State to govern
impartially. When a State adopts rules governing its elec-
tion machinery or defining electoral boundaries, those
rules must serve the interests of the entire community....
If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-
whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-
that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point
in time . . .they violate the constitutional guarantee of• • 127
equal protection.
Stevens argued that the logic of racial gerrymandering claims
could not be limited because "[a]s long as [the Equal Protection
Clause] proscribes gerrymandering against such groups, its pro-
scription must provide comparable protection for other cognizable
groups of voters as well."'8 Thus, departing from their positions in
previous cases, at least some members of the Court in Karcher rec-
ognized a cognizable harm caused by the unrestrained power to
develop reapportionment plans and called for further scrutiny of the
legitimacy of the redistricting process.
C. Davis v. Bandemer
The next time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of parti-
san gerrymandering was in Davis v. Bandemer when a six-three
majority ruled that such claims were justiciable under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 29 In Bandemer v. Davis, the district court
addressed the issue after the Indiana legislature passed plans cre-
ated by the Indiana Republican Party'30 with the purpose of
protecting "[Republican] incumbents and creat[ing] every possible
125. One of the circuit court judges noted that "partisanship produced artificial
bulges or appendages of two districts so as to place the residences of [certain
congressmen] in districts where they would be running against incumbents." Id. at
764 n.33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 748 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
130. 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
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'safe' Republican district possible . . . .""' Indiana Democrats
brought suit alleging an unconstitutional gerrymander after having
received 51.9% of the popular vote, but only fort-three of one hun-
dred seats in the state house under the new plan. 2
While a majority of the Court recognized that extreme partisan
gerrymandering can offend the Constitution, its reluctance to im-
merse itself in the politics of redistricting and constant judging of
reapportionment plans was again evident:
Inviting attack on [reapportionment schemes] would too
much embroil the judiciary in second-guessing what has
consistently been referred to as a political task for the legis-
lature, a task that should not be monitored too closely
unless the express or tacit goal is to effect its removal from
legislative halls. We decline to take a major step toward
that end, which would be so much at odds with our history
'3and experience.
Perhaps due to that reluctance, or due to a lack of consensus on
legitimate criteria for districting, the Court limited the cause of ac-
tion to the narrow issue of election outcomes.'34
The application of the standard announced in Davis supports
the view that the Court sought to narrow the potential class of
partisan gerrymandering claims. The Court found inconclusive the
fact that Democrats did not receive seats in proportion to their
voting share, stating, "the mere fact that a particular apportionment
scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular
district to elect the representatives of its choice does not render the
scheme constitutionally infirm.' 35 In addition, it found that the
lower court's focus on the outcome of a single election was similarly
unsatisfactory because "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only
when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or group of voters' influence [on] the
political process as a whole.' 36 Because the district court found
neither that the Democrats would be unable to secure control of the
Assembly in one of the following elections, nor that they had no
hope of doing better after the 1990 census, the Supreme Court
overruled the finding of unconstitutionality.
37
131. Id. at 1488.
132. See id. at 1485.
133. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 131.
136. Id. at 132.
137. See id. at 135.
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Not surprisingly, Davis v. Bandemer has been criticized for
establishing a standard which makes a constitutional violation
practically impossible to prove."' Because the nature of gerry-
mandering typically results either in some competitive districts or in
some districts so packed with the minority party that it is sure to
win, plaintiffs will almost never be able to claim they have been
consistently frustrated in expressing their will. In addition, it is
unlikely that either political party in a partisan gerrymandering
claim ever will be able to maintain that it has been excluded
continuously from the political processes. Moreover, with respect to
the issue of incumbency protection, the case virtually ensures that
the policy will never be scrutinized. Only if and when plaintiffs can
meet the stringent "effects" standard of the partisan gerrymandering
claim will the Court consider the legitimacy of the districting
process and potentially consider the legitimacy of protecting
incumbents. In the more likely scenario where the Court finds no
discriminatory effects, however, it will not have to reach the
question of whether the criteria used in creating the districts serve a
legitimate state interest.39
D. The Effects of Bandemer
Cases since Davis v. Bandemer support the theory that the stan-
dard virtually ensures that courts will almost never have to evaluate
the legitimacy of states' districting policies in general, and the policy
of incumbency protection in particular. Badham v. Eu 140 is perhaps
the clearest example of the effect of the partisan gerrymandering
standard. Badham addressed United States Representative Phil Bur-
ton's infamous "Burtonmander,' 14' a plan pairing three sets of
Republican incumbents and splitting one Republican incumbent's
district into six pieces. 42 Under this plan, the Democrats' lead in the
California congressional delegation increased from a slim twenty-
two to twenty-one lead in 1980 to a sizable twenty-eight to seventeen
majority in 1982.143 In 1984, Republicans won slightly more than half
the vote, but Democrats took 60% of the seats; in 1986 and 1988, the
trend continued, as the Democrats maintained their 60% share of the
138. See Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 318.
139. See id. at 319-20.
140. Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
142. See Bernard Grofman, An Expert Witness Perspective on Continuing and Emerg-
ing Voting Rights Controversies: From One Person, One Vote to Partisan Gerrymandering,
21 STETSON L. REv. 783, 811 (1992).
143. Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 1671 n.142.
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seats despite the fact that Republicans garnered 47% of the votes.'"
In addition, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
plan suggested foul play; after being defeated by a ballot initiative
sponsored by the Republican Party, the lame-duck Democratic gov-
ernor and legislature then passed an alternative plan which was
barely distinguishable from the original just as the Governor was
about to leave office.
4 5
Despite what many would consider evidence of gerrymander-
ing violative of the Constitution, the lower court denied the partisan
gerrymandering claim. 6 Focusing on the "effects" test articulated in
Bandemer, the court found that the complaint failed to make any al-
legation regarding the California Republicans' role in "the political
process as a whole," nor did it allege that they were "shut out" of the
process or "entirely ignored" by their congressional representa-
tives.147 In addition, the court found that the "bizarre and irregular"
shapes of the districts were not alleged to have affected Republican
voters any differently than other voters. 14 Because plaintiffs failed to
show "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair
representation,"' 49 the complaint was dismissed without leave to
amend.' ° When the case was appealed, the Supreme Court issued a
memorandum affirmance.'5'
Potentially more problematic than the fact that Davis v.
Bandemer provides little hope for scrutiny of partisan gerrymanders
is the fact that some courts have interpreted it to actually ensure the
policy of incumbency protection. For example, in Prosser v. Elections
Board,, 2 Republican legislators filed suit after the 1990 census
challenging the apportionment of the Wisconsin legislature as
unconstitutional and violative of the Voting Rights Act.' In the
course of its opinion, the court incorrectly assumed that one of the
essential problems of partisan gerrymandering was that it forced
contests between incumbents:
The broader problem is that if as a result of redistricting
two incumbents find themselves residents of the same dis-
trict, and neither decides to retire or to move to another
district, they must run for "re-election" without any of the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1671-72 n.142.
146. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 666.
147. Id. at 670.
148. Id. at 671.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
152. 793 F. Supp. 859 (W.D. Wis. 1992); see also Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 1671.
153. 793 F. Supp. at 862.
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usual advantages of incumbency, because their opponent
is also an incumbent. In recent years ... incumbents have
had a marked advantage in electoral contests with new-
comers, so a partisan redistricting plan will seek to "pair".
• . as many legislators of the opposite party, and as few of
their own party, as possible; more precisely, pair as many
opposing (and as few of one's own) legislators who plan
not to retire.., as possible.' 4
Depriving incumbents of their usual advantages-including the
advantage gained by the ability to manipulate the district bounda-
ries-was, in the eyes of the court, a harm to be avoided. Without
further explanation of whether and why this advantage was legiti-
mate, the court adopted its own plan in part because it paired the
fewest incumbents.' The Court recognized the possible objection
that "in protecting incumbents, our plan perpetuates and entrenches
political imbalances created by the existing, and unconstitutional,
apportionment," but it found this objection unjustified. 6
Prosser v. Elections Board is not the only case to misinterpret the
problem of partisan gerrymandering recognized by the Court in
Davis v. Bandemer. Courts seem similarly misguided in their concep-
tion of the role of judicial oversight as a check on the self-interested
manipulation of district boundaries.5 17 The focus on minimizing con-
tests between incumbents completely misses the mark:
At best, the coupling of incumbents in newly created
districts may provide evidence that partisan power in the
redistricting process is more concentrated than in years
past. On the other hand ... [it] could indicate that there are
changing demographics that compel a partial realignment
of power blocs. Conversely, the absence of incumbent
coupling does nothing to ensure the sanctity of the process
from . . .redistricting plans drawn to protect a sufficient
number of incumbents so as to secure legislative
approval.'
154. Id. at 864.
155. Id. at 871.
156. Id.
157. See Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1499 (S.D. Ala.) ("[W]e have discovered
no justifiable basis for the fact that the Pierce Plan places [two incumbents] in the
same district. The Supreme Court has recognized the policy of 'avoiding contests
between incumbent representatives' as a legitimate objective. Accordingly, we have
modified the Pierce Plan so that the two congressmen will not be in the same dis-
trict." (citations omitted)), aff'd sub nom. Camp v. Wesch, 504 U.S. 902 (1992); see also
Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 1673.
158. Issacharoff, supra note 106, at 1673-74 (footnotes omitted).
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The critical lesson, which courts seem to have misunderstood, is
not that incumbents must be protected from having to compete with
one another, but that their influence on redistricting can be prob-
lematic if left unchecked. Bandemer therefore not only deters critical
examination of the redistricting process through its demanding
standard of proof, but it also guarantees that special treatment of
incumbents will be protected without question. In effect, confronting
the problem of excessive political manipulation of the districting
process has secured the very forces of self-interest it was intended to
limit.
E. Incumbency Protection and the Voting Rights Act
The Supreme Court's reluctance to become involved in reap-
portionment and its failure to evaluate incumbents' influence over
the process is particularly problematic when analyzed in the context
of cases interpreting the Voting Rights Act.' 9 The Voting Rights Act
is a congressional response to the problem of the disenfranchisement
of racial minorities; its purpose is to restore fairness in the political
process and to ensure effective representation for minority interests
in government9" Recently, the Supreme Court has scrutinized
closely redistricting plans under the Act in an attempt to delineate
the extent to which the influence of race is permissible. 6' Thus, the
policy of protecting incumbents remains unfettered while the use of
information on race may be subject to strict scrutiny. This double
standard at best limits the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act. At
worst, it raises doubts about the legitimacy of the entire electoral
process.
One example of the dangerous interplay between the standards
for partisan gerrymandering claims and Voting Rights Act
compliance is the Pope v. Blue' '-Shaw v. Reno'6 sequence. As a result
of the 1990 Census, North Carolina was entitled to one additional
U.S. congressional seat, increasing its delegation from eleven to
twelve. Because a number of counties in North Carolina had a
history of voting discrimination, the Voting Rights Act required that
changes in voting practices in those jurisdictions be precleared by
159. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110 § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1988)).
160. See David 0. Barrett, Note, The Remedial Use of Race-Based Redistricting After
Shaw v. Reno, 70 IND. L.J. 255 (1994).
161. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993).
162. 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.) (three-judge panel), aff'd, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
163. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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the Attorney General.'" The General Assembly, which created the
redistricting plans and submitted them for preclearance, was
controlled by Democrats.' 6" After its original plan, which included
only one majority-minority district, was refused preclearance, the
General Assembly then passed another plan creating two majority-
minority districts, both of which were contorted to protect White
Democratic incumbents. That plan was pre-cleared, and it
immediately became the subject of intense controversy.
Upon passage of the second reapportionment plan, the Repub-
lican Party of North Carolina and a group of registered voters
brought suit. In the case brought by the Republican Party, Pope v.
Blue,' 6 plaintiffs alleged that they were prevented from influencing
the redistricting process6 7 and that their constitutional rights were
denied because the plan was designed "primarily to further the in-
terests of White incumbent Democratic Congressmen in avoiding
• •. • • . • ,,161
competitive elections.
Using the standards elaborated in Bandemer and Badham, the
Court found that the reapportionment plan was indeed designed in
part to disadvantage a political group, but it stressed that plaintiffs
failed to allege that they were entirely "shut out of the political proc-
ess."'69 In order to meet the "effects" standard of Bandemer, plaintiffs
would have to show that "they have been or will be consistently de-
graded in their participation in the entire political process, not just in
the process of redistricting."' 70 The plaintiffs were unable to make
such a showitig, and thus failed to state an equal protection claim. In
addition, although plaintiffs alleged that the General Assembly
could have created more compact, contiguous districts which also
complied with the Voting Rights Act, the district court denied such a
plan was constitutionally required because "[t]he Supreme Court
has often recognized that redistricting is an inherently political
process."'7 ' Like Badham v. Eu, the court's decision was summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court.7
164. Section 5 preclearance is intended to ensure that a change in voting proce-
dures in a covered jurisdiction does not have the purpose or effect of "denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982).
165. Although the Governor of North Carolina at that time was Republican, North
Carolina does not give the governor veto power. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392
(W.D.N.C. 1992).
166. 809 F. Supp. at 392.
167. See id. at 395.
168. Id. at 396 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint, para. 91).
169. Id. at 397.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 398.
172. See Pope v. Blue, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
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Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, five White
registered voters also challenged the reapportionment plan on
grounds that it was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in Shaw
v. Reno.'73 Their claim alleged that:
[T]he plan deliberately 'creates two Congressional Districts
in which a majority of African-American voters was
concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other
considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness,
geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions with the
purpose of 'creat[ing] Congressional Districts along racial
lines' and assuring the election of two African-American
representatives. 74
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court
in Shaw, characterized the claim as one that objects to "redistricting
legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally
can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of
voting, without regard to traditional districting principles and with-
out sufficiently compelling justification."175 Concluding that the plan
was indeed unexplainable on grounds other than race-despite the
fact that the bizarre shape of the districts could be explained by the
efforts of Democrats to protect primarily White incumbents-the
176Court found that such a plan required strict scrutiny. Dismissing
the argument that racial gerrymandering claims are functionally
equivalent to partisan gerrymandering claims, the Court stated,
"nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and po-
litical gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional
scrutiny."' According to the Court, classifying citizens on the basis
of race threatens special harms: "It reinforces racial stereotypes and
threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by
signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial
group rather than their constituency as a whole.' 17 Thus, the Court
held that a reapportionment statute that, "though race-neutral on its
face, cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to sepa-
rate voters on the basis of race . "'n must pass strict scrutiny to be
considered within the acceptable limits of the Constitution.'s
173. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-4 (1993).
174. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 418 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint para. 36(A)).
175. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642.
176. Id. at 657.
177. Id. at 631.
178. Id.
179. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 649.
180. Id. at 657.
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When the case was remanded to the district court, a majority of
the three judge panel found the plan constitutional on grounds that
it was narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interests in
complying with the Voting Rights Act.181 On appeal in Shaw v. Hunt,h 182
the Supreme Court reversed. The Court rejected the argument that
the creation of a majority-minority district was required by the
Voting Rights Act based on earlier findings that Congress did not
intend for states to maximize majority-minority districts under the
Act.' It also rejected the argument that the bizarrely drawn District
12 was narrowly tailored to avoid a vote dilution claim because such
a claim requires that a minority group be "geographically compact."
District 12 failed to meet this requirement.
Examination of the Shaw case reveals that the Court's failure to
scrutinize the policy of incumbency protection undermines the
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act. In Pope, the Court was willing
to accept bizarrely shaped districts in a plan designed primarily to
protect White incumbent Democratic politicians.' Although the
plaintiffs asserted that more compact plans with majority-minority
districts could be created, the Court rejected the notion that such
plans were constitutionally required.'86 When the same set of facts
was litigated as a racial gerrymander, however, the Court found that
the district shapes could not be explained on grounds other than
race, despite its awareness of the influence of incumbency protection
on the shape of the districts. In finding the plan unconstitutional,
the Court in effect told legislators that bizarrely-shaped districts
drawn solely to protect incumbents will be protected, but those
drawn with the object of creating majority-minority districts will
not. Legislators may learn one of two lessons from the Court's
opinion (1) attempts by the majority party to create majority-
minority districts will potentially limit its right to electoral
181. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 474.
182. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
183. Id. at 1903-04.
184. See id. at 1906.
185. See Pope v. Blue, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
186. See id.; Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 397.
187. Justice Stevens' dissent forcefully refuted the majority's position:
If race rather than incumbency protection had been the dominant considera-
tion, it seems highly unlikely that the Democrats would have drawn this
bizarre district rather than accepting more compact options that were clearly
available. If race, rather than politics, had been the "predominant" considera-
tion for the Democrats, they could have accepted the Republican Plan ...
[i]nstead ... the legislature deliberately crafted a districting plan that would
accommodate the needs of Democratic incumbents.
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1916 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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advantage by inviting strict scrutiny,' and (2) as a minority they can
use the Voting Rights Act to invoke strict scrutiny of a redistricting
plan that would be found constitutional under a partisan
gerrymandering analysis.Y9 Under either scenario, the objectives of
the Voting Rights Act are sacrificed to the interests of primarily
White incumbents.
The troubling irony of the Court's dual standard for partisan
gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering is also illustrated by the
Terrazas v. Slagle'"-Vera v. Richards'9' sequence of cases. After the 1990
Census, Texas gained three congressional seats and sought to enact a
reapportionment plan pursuant to the Texas Constitution and
subject to the Voting Rights Act. Republican plaintiffs brought suit
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting
Rights Act alleging that the plan sacrificed the rights of racial and
political minorities to enhance re-election chances of Anglo-
Democratic incumbents.9 2 Interpreting Bandemer to require evidence
of a group perpetuating its power through gerrymandering in a
political structure where the minority group lacked power to
counteract the tactic, the court dismissed the partisan gerry-
mandering claim because plaintiffs failed to show that Republicans
had no influence in the state political process as a whole.9 3 The court
also found that the plan did not dilute the voting rights of racial or
ethnic minorities in violation of either the Constitution or the Voting
Rights Act.' "
188. Of course, legislators in areas subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act will still
have to seek preclearance, and will not be able to create districts which dilute minor-
ity voting strength. However, to the extent that the Court's rulings also potentially
reflect a higher threshold for proof of vote dilution, see Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S.
Ct. 2647 (1994), or even doubt about the legitimacy of the Voting Rights Act itself,
legislators may view their obligations under the Act differently. Thus, they may be
less likely to attempt to create minority-majority districts on average, and particu-
larly reluctant to do so in situations where it does not appear absolutely required.
189. Justice Stevens also noted the potential manipulation of the Voting Rights Act
in his discussion of standing in his dissent:
It is plain that these intervenors are using their allegations of impermissibly
race-based districting to achieve the same substantive result that their previ-
ous, less emotionally charged partisan gerrymandering challenge failed to
secure .... [Ilt is inevitable that allegations of racial gerrymandering will be-
come a standard means by which unsuccessful majority-race candidates, and
their parties, will seek to obtain judicially what they could not obtain elec-
torally.
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1908 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. 821 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
191. 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
192. This is how plaintiffs' original cause of action was described in Vera, 861 F.
Supp. at 1314.
193. 821 F. Supp. at 1174.
194. See id. at 1171-72.
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After the enactment of the challenged plan and the 1992 elec-
tions, registered voters also brought suit alleging that twenty-four of
the State's thirty Congressional Districts were unconstitutional in
Vera v. Richards. 9 This time, however, the suit alleged that the plan
was an unacceptable racial gerrymander under Shaw v. Reno. 196 In
evaluating a claim using district appearance as evidence, the exten-
sive history of incumbency protection and bizarrely shaped districts
in Texas was particularly relevant.197 As a former member of the
Texas House and Senate involved in the 1980 and 1990 redistricting
battles explained: "[C]ompactness is not a 'traditional districting
principle' in Texas. For the most part, the only traditional districting
principles that have ever operated here are that incumbents are pro-
tected and each party grabs as much as it can.',
98
Not surprisingly, Congressional incumbents had been actively
involved in the redistricting process, with the Texas Democratic
Congressional Delegation forming a redistricting committee to de-
velop plans according to incumbents' needs and preferences.'" The
court found that the plan reflected incumbents' interests and suc-
cessfully avoided pairing them to favor their chances of re-
election.20° In focusing on District 30 in particular, the Vera court
found that a more compact African American majority district could
have been drawn if it were not for the concerns of incumbents.20' The
need to mediate competing objectives and adhere to the equipopu-
lation requirement had resulted in irregularities in the shape of the
district: "[Aifter [the incumbents] won back territory on the east and
west of District [thirty], the District was forced further north, be-
cause of the traditional one-person, one-vote requirement of
population equality among districts.,
20 2
195. 861 F. Supp. at 1309.
196. See id.
197. In the 1960s Texas was home to the infamous District 6, a contorted district
drawn to support incumbent "Tiger" Teague. See id. at 1312; see also Brief of
Appellants at 8, Lawson v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (No. 94-806) (citing examples
of protecting incumbents at the expense of compactness).
198. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1313 n.9.
199. Id. at 1317.
200. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1317-18.
201. See id. at 1321; see also Reply Brief of Appellants at 4, Lawson v. Vera, 116 S.
Ct. 1941 (1996) (No. 94-806) ("The reason the State chose irregular over regularly
shaped versions of Districts 18, 29, and 30 was to protect White incumbents and to
aid White Senator Gene Green.").
202. Brief of Appellants at 12, Lawson v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (No. 94-806).
Expanding the district to the North increased the racial diversity of the district be-
cause the area to the North contained lower percentages of minority residents. State
Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 13, Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (No. 94-
805).
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Similar influences and tensions had affected Districts twenty-
nine and eighteen, where the court noted: "[T]he only way to protect
all incumbents . . . draw two majority-minority districts, and get
[sufficient] votes in the House . . . and in the Senate, was for one
district to go through Downtown and the other to go around it."203
Once again, because of the competing demands of incumbents, the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act, and the one-person one-vote
principle, bizarrely-shaped districts were drawn despite the fact that
more compact versions were possible.2 4 As a result of the plan, the
composition of the Texas legislature grew from one African
American, four Latinos, and twenty-two Anglos, to two African
Americans, five Latinos and twenty-three Anglos.20 '
Upon review of the evidence, the district court rejected both the
argument that Texas did not adhere to a policy of compactness and
the argument that the irregular shapes were caused by Texas' policy
of protecting incumbents. With respect to incumbency protection,
the court noted that no more than three incumbents were jeopard-
ized by the creation of minority districts. 206 It found, without
explaining why, that the block-by-block computer-generated exclu-
sion of voters was "much different in degree from the generalized
and legitimate goal of incumbent and seniority protection previ-
ously recognized by the Supreme Court., 27 Instead, the court found
that the boundaries sabotaged traditional principles of compactness
and stated, "[i]ncumbent protection is a valid state interest only to
the extent that it is not a pretext for unconstitutional racial gerry-
mandering." 20°
The court rejected the incumbency protection rationale because
it found that incumbents' attempts to design their districts were
largely dictated by concerns about the racial composition of the
voters.2 9 Accordingly, "racial gerrymandering was an essential part
of incumbency protection, as African-American voters were deliber-
ately segregated on account of their race among several
203. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1325 n.30.
204. Brief of Appellants at 11, Lawson v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (No. 94-806).
205. See Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1314.
206. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1334.
207. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1334. Nowhere did the court explain why the use of
computer technology makes a legally significant difference in the State's effort to
protect incumbents. State Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 11 n.7, Bush v. Vera, 116
S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (Nos. 94-805, 94-806, 94-988). Moreover, while the Court suggested
that the State inappropriately used race to identify likely Democratic voters at the
census block level because partisan voting patterns were not on the computer sys-
tem, it ignored the fact that such data was available to incumbents from the national
party. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 10 n.16, Lawson v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)
(No. 94-806).
208. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1336.
209. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1338.
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Congressional districts. 210 With respect to one district, the court
found, "[it] was carefully gerrymandered on a racial basis to achieve
a certain number of African-American voters; in order to protect
incumbents, other African-American voters were deliberately fenced
out.. . and placed in other districts that are equally 'untraditional.'
,,21' Likewise, in two other challenged districts, the court stated, "the
goal of incumbent protection was itself realized by the deliberate
segregation of voters on the basis of race.... Incumbent Democrats
were fencing minorities into their districts or into the new majority-
minority districts while those same minorities were effectively being
removed from Republican incumbents' districts. 2 Thus, because
those districts were "formed in utter disregard for traditional
redistricting criteria and because their shapes are ultimately
unexplainable on grounds other than the racial quotas," they were
subject to strict scrutiny. 213
Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that the districts
neither were narrowly tailored nor served a compelling state
interest.1 4 For perhaps the first time, a court was forced to address
the issue of incumbency protection, and it found that such a policy
was not a compelling state interest strong enough to overcome
adherence to an objective districting principle such as compact-215
ness. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court had earlier held that
compactness was not constitutionally required and could be
subordinated to other state objectives, the court imposed a
standard that Texas had never before adhered to in its history.
Noting that a Shaw claim focuses on the appearance of the districts,
the court held that "to be narrowly tailored, a district must have the
least possible amount of irregularity in shape, . . . [and w]here
obvious alternatives to a racially offensive districting scheme exit,
the bizarre districts are not narrowly tailored. 1 7
Significantly, the Vera court also upheld other challenged dis-
tricts that were also designed to protect incumbents, in part because
they were less bizarrely-shaped. 21 '8 Although plaintiffs alleged that
other districts also produced racial segregation, the court concluded
that both race and politics influenced the divisions of the districts
because the incumbent Congressmen were seeking to include
210. Id. at 1339.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1341.
213. Id.
214. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1345.
215. Id. at 1343-44.
216. See discussion Part III.A, supra.
217. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1343-44 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
218. Id. at 1344.
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Democrats in their districts. Moreover, because they were not highly
irregular in shape and "the addition or subtraction of these minority
populations was not proportionately significant," they did not re-
quire strict scrutiny. In other words, where the twin goals of
incumbency protection and Voting Rights Act compliance did not
result in irregularly shaped districts, no constitutional violation was
found. On appeal in Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court agreed that the
"bizarre" districts required strict scrutiny and affirmed the judg-
ment20
The courts' decisions are problematic for a number of reasons.
Most important, they overlook the fact that irregularity of bounda-
ries may be powerful evidence that racial considerations did not in
fact predominate but instead were subordinated to other state ob-
jectives. In ignoring the complex interaction of influences, the Bush v.
Vera decision imposes an additional hurdle in the way of attempts to
create majority-minority districts. As Texas noted in its brief, the
"failure to consider the highly irregular shapes of Texas' majority-
White districts, as evidence of a general, non-racial abandonment of
compactness, resulted in a double standard, treating minority vot-
ers, minority candidates, and minority incumbents worse than
White voters, candidates and incumbents."' ' The result of such a
double standard is that recognition of minority interests will be sig-
nificantly more difficult:
Under the rule established by the court . . . a State may
construct irregular districts to recognize the voting
strength of any group that is not a historically disadvan-
taged racial minority . . . . Yet, to obtain a district that
recognizes their interests, racial minorities must convince
Texas to forsake all of its other districting goals and, even
more to maximize the regular shape of opportunity dis-
tricts. This heaps an additional disadvantage on minority
groups which already suffer barriers to participation in the
political process.22
Equally troubling is that the decision implicitly says that
"Anglo officeholders may not fight to keep minority voters ....
219. Id. at 1345.
220. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
221. Reply Brief for Appellants at 7.
222. Brief for Appellees at 57; see also United States Supreme Court Official Tran-
script at 35, Bush v. Vera, No. 94-988, 94-806, 94-805, WL 729899 (Dec. 5, 1995)
(Penda Hair of the NAACP stating that "to single out minority opportunity districts
and say that they have to have a special Federal rule of compactness that does not
apply to majority White districts or any other districts in Texas we believe disadvan-
tages them in the process").
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[and] minority voters may not attempt to retain officeholders who
have been favorable to them" when such attempts result in irregu-
larly shaped districts.22 In effect, the decision institutionalizes the
very disparate racial treatment it purportedly sought to overcome.
Rather than strengthening the command of equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the court is actually undermining it.
The analysis of the Pope-Shaw and Terrazas-Vera lines of cases
thus crystallize the troubling consequences of the courts' reluctance
to scrutinize incumbency protection, particularly when they have
chosen to scrutinize strictly plans under the Voting Rights Act. Dis-
tricts created solely to increase the likelihood of an incumbent's re-
election are virtually beyond reproach because of the extremely dif-
ficult burden of proof required by partisan gerrymandering
claims. =4 On the other hand, districts designed to increase minority
voting power are vulnerable because they are easily subject to strict
scrutiny.2 The double standard results in disparate treatment for
minority voters and enables manipulation of the Voting Rights Act
by individuals or parties who are dissatisfied with a redistricting
plan but cannot prove partisan gerrymandering. 6 In addition, legis-
lators acting in self-interest will be more cautious in their use of
racial data and less likely to create majority-minority districts, par-
ticularly if such districts would be irregular. The dual standards for
partisan and racial gerrymandering claims therefore perpetuate the
relative powerlessness of minority voters by protecting entrenched
interests at the expense of the Voting Rights Act.
Even if the double standard applied to racial and partisan
gerrymandering claims does not result in a cognizable reduction in
attempts to increase minority voting power, the approach is
disturbing for other reasons. Ultimately, the Court's standards send
the message to both voters and politicians that protecting
incumbents takes preference over attempts to rectify discrimination
223. State Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 45.
224. As Appellees pointed out, "[tihe Court has consistently emphasized that
protection of incumbents is a legitimate State districting principle which, in the ex-
ercise of State discretion, may be given a higher priority than compactness." Brief for
Appellees at 33, Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (citations omitted).
225. This proposition however, depends on the court's willingness to accept in-
cumbency protection as a legitimate policy as well as the court's willingness to
overlook the shape of the district. For example, on remand, the district court in
North Carolina upheld the districts under strict scrutiny. Thus, notwithstanding the
irregular shape of the districts, the plan was deemed valid. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.
Supp. 408 (1994). However, to the extent that the plans are subject to more scrutiny,
the probability that more of them will be declared unconstitutional increases.
226. The possibility that the Voting Rights Act is being used by the Republican
Party for their benefit is discussed in Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right If He Had Said, "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the
Only Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1248 (1993).
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by increasing minority voting power. This message can be
understood as an "expressive harm" whereby governmental
action-in this case the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court-
undermines political integrity and threatens the legitimacy of the
electoral process.=7 The harm is exacerbated by the fact that the
Court was concerned with social perceptions of redistricting only
where bizarrely-shaped districts serve to enhance minority voting
power. Thus, as the Court in Shaw v. Reno was compelled to
recognize an "expressive harm" based on its belief that the bizarrely
drawn districts might undermine voters' faith in the integrity of the
electoral process, its decision itself was an expressive harm of
potentially greater magnitude. Rather than promoting the integrity
of the process, the Court has perpetuated its most objectionable
aspects at the expense of those who have traditionally suffered most
and has further eroded the legitimacy of the electoral system.
IV. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to involve itself in
what is considered a task appropriately left to the state, having
stepped into the redistricting thicket in the quest for "fair and effec-
tive representation," it cannot legitimately scrutinize only some
aspects while leaving others unquestioned. The above analysis of
incumbency protection clearly reveals the danger of the Court's
piecemeal approach to examining redistricting plans. In failing to
scrutinize the legitimacy of incumbency protection in general, the
Court has granted legislators the power to pursue their self-interest
and to potentially threaten the democratic process. Moreover, that
failure is particularly harmful where other factors, such as the use of
race, are subject to strict scrutiny, thereby allowing incumbents to
protect themselves at the expense of historically disenfranchised
groups. Finally, even if a court does examine incumbency protection
in the context of a racial gerrymandering claim, limiting considera-
tion of that practice only to those districts designed to comply with
the Voting Rights Act suggests the very disparate treatment the Act
was intended to remedy.
To say that the current approach of the Supreme Court is incor-
rect or even illegitimate does not, however, answer the question of
what a proper approach would be. While any in-depth analysis of
different suggestions is beyond the scope of this Note, a number of
observations and suggestions can be made.
227. For a discussion of the meaning of "expressive harms" in the context of Shaw
v. Reno, see Pildes & Niemi, supra note 4.
228. Id.
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First, while concerns about the institutional capacity of the
Court and about the appropriate distribution of power between the
states and the federal government are indeed legitimate, they may
be inappropriate in this context. In the past, the Court has recog-
nized the need to become involved where the problem is one that
cannot be rectified through the political process. Just as the Court
recognized that voters were unable to correct the problem of malap-
portionment in Baker v. Carry9 the Court should likewise recognize
that voters are hostage to self-interested legislators who have no in-
centive to modify redistricting criteria from which they benefit.
Deference to legislators' attempts to protect themselves through re-
districting is unwarranted in a situation such as this where the Court
may be the only means of correction.
One possible approach would be to alter the standards for
judging partisan gerrymandering claims and reduce partisan ma-
nipulation of the Voting Rights Act. Toward that end, the Court
could focus on the redistricting process and judge redistricting plans
according to formal criteria, rather than the electoral outcome. For
example, the Court could capitalize on what it has done in the con-
text of the Voting Rights Act, and require that all districts meet a
certain standard of compactness. Daniel Polsby and Robert Popper
argue that a compactness standard, combined with the "one-person
one-vote" requirement, and a requirement of contiguity would con-
siderably limit the ability to gerrymander2 30 They argue that the
equipopulation requirement of Baker v. Carr, standing alone, is a
weak tool for ensuring fair elections because gerrymanderers remain
free to draw districts in any shape in hopes of manipulating out-
come to their advantage231 A compactness requirement, however,
would make gerrymandering significantly more difficult because it
would constrain strategic line drawing; the less discretion the line
drawers have, the less able they are to influence election outcomes.
Moreover, Polsby and Popper argue that a compactness standard is
as judicially manageable as the "one-person, one-vote" standard.
The authors offer a variety of means by which compactness may be
judged 2 and posit that any voter placed in a minority district would
have standing and could assert a prima facie case where they could
proffer a more compact plan.n3
Alternatively, when faced with a partisan gerrymandering
claim, the Court could employ a multi-factor approach which takes
into consideration both formal criteria and outcomes. Bernard
229. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
230. Polsby & Popper, supra note 1, at 333.
231. See id. at 329.
232. Id. at 329-40.
233. Id. at 333.
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Grofman, for example, has developed an approach that would con-
sider factors such as (1) differential treatment of incumbents of the
major parties, (2) whether voters had been concentrated or dis-
persed, (3) whether deviation from compactness and failure to
follow political boundaries systematically favored one party, and (4)
whether the plan limits the number of competitive seats in such a
way that one party is likely to be disadvantaged for the foreseeable
future.3 He argues that consideration of statistical complexities is
not beyond the institutional competence of the court. Indeed, he
counters that the complexities involved in gerrymandering claims
are less than those considered by the Court in Title VII cases.3'
Again, establishing a list of criteria informs actors and encourages
compliance, and provides a judicially administrable test for evaluat-
ing partisan gerrymandering claims.
Another approach that has not received much attention is en-
couraging states to explore technology aimed at computer-
automated redistricting. Professor Issacharoff argues that automated
redistricting would require states to articulate their redistricting cri-
teria in advance and thereby encourage public scrutiny. He
suggests that courts could require states to submit their objectives to
a computer program prior to the release of formal census data. The
plans would be easy to judge because "the controlling computer al-
gorithm would make explicit and obvious the policy choices of the
states in ways that would allow courts to review reasonably and in-
telligently the relevant choices for unconstitutional attributes.
'
,2
7
Yet another alternative would be to encourage the use of
independent electoral commissions to design redistricting plans
without any reference to political considerations or partisan voting
breakdowns. Such commissions would have the obvious advantage
of limiting incumbents' ability to act in self-interest and, depending
on their composition and powers, could reduce the need for
prolonged litigation and judicial interference.23' Although such
commissions are obviously not immune to political pressures, it is
beyond doubt that removing the process of redistricting from the
234. See generally Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Per-
spective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 155 (1985).
235. Id.
236. Issacharoff, supra note 106 at 1697 (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 1699.
238. The organization Common Cause advocates adoption of its Model Act that
calls for a five member commission, four of whom are selected by the leaders of the
majority and minority parties, and the fifth member elected by the other four. The
commission would be given guidelines for drafting district boundaries with oppor-
tunities for public participation. The guidelines would then serve as standards by
which courts could judge the plan in the event of litigation. See Adams, supra note 19,
at 60.
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legislature would decrease incumbent influence. Moreover, the
establishment of such commissions would free the legislature from
prolonged battles over redistricting and enable them to devote more
time to other matters of importance to voters. A number of states
have already established such commissions and they readily serve
as models.n
Finally, the Court might also choose to address the issue of in-
cumbency protection only in certain situations, such as those dealing
with the Voting Rights Act. Since a long history of incumbency pro-
tection suggests that the Court would not be willing to declare that
incumbency protection in redistricting per se violates the Constitu-
tion, a less drastic alternative would be for the Court either to rule
that incumbency protection must yield to the objectives of the Vot-
ing Rights Act whenever the dual objectives conflict, or that
incumbency protection is a sufficiently strong state objective that it
can be used to rebut a claim of racial gerrymandering. In this way,
the Court might begin to establish a hierarchy of districting princi-
ples that is consistent with the goal of fair and effective
representation. Such an approach leaves the states free to redistrict
according to their redistricting principles and would also recognize
the complexity of influences that shape a redistricting plan. The ob-
vious limitation to this approach is that incumbency protection
would still remain largely unquestioned and would only become an
issue in cases dealing with the Voting Rights Act.
While these suggestions are not meant to be comprehensive,
they further illustrate the inadequacy of the Court's current ap-
proach to the problem of incumbents' influence in redistricting.
Indeed, without necessarily endorsing any one of the alternatives as
superior, it appears that any of the options would represent an im-
provement over the current approach. Progress toward a coherent
approach to redistricting will necessarily require more analysis of
these alternatives, but to the extent that a variety of alternatives ex-
ist, progress does not appear to be difficult.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of incumbency protection, the history of its
treatment by the Court, and in particular, its effect on the Voting
Rights Act suggest that "fair and effective representation" may be
more illusion than reality. More analysis of redistricting criteria is
needed to develop a coherent theory of redistricting, and indeed, to
determine what should be considered "fairly" drawn districts. The
239. Among the states that have established such commissions are Colorado,
Montana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. See id. at 80.
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above suggestions indicate some of the research that is necessary to
develop such a theory. In the meantime, the conclusions of this Note
suggest that the Supreme Court should at least begin to question the
role of incumbency protection in redistricting and whether or under
what circumstances such a practice offends the Constitution. Further
consideration of second-order issues about who should be
developing redistricting plans and what role the Court should play
is also necessary, as is the potential future role of independent
electoral commissions. Such inquiry, while difficult, is essential not
only for historically disenfranchised voters who currently bear the
burden of the Court's reluctance to intervene, but to all voters who
rely on the legitimacy of the electoral process to express their
consent to be governed.

